Monday, March 07, 2016

[CAFC] Patent damage cases

Lucent Techs v. Gateway (2009)
Uniloc v. Microsoft (2011)
LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer (2012)
VirnetX v. Cisco Systems (2014)

Friday, February 12, 2016

[CAFC] Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)

The Federal Circuit decided en banc Friday to retain its long-standing rule that overseas sales of a product don't exhaust a patent owner's right to sue in the U.S., concluding that a 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision that foreign sales exhaust copyrights has no impact on patent law.

In a 10-2 decision that runs 129 pages, the full court held that its own 2001 decision that only sales in the U.S. trigger patent exhaustion remains good law despite the high court's recent copyright decision.

The high court case, known as Kirtsaeng, "did not address patent law or whether a foreign sale should be viewed as conferring authority to engage in otherwise-infringing domestic acts," Federal Circuit Judge Richard Taranto wrote for the majority.

Under the Patent Act, "a foreign sale is properly treated as neither conclusively nor even presumptively exhausting the U.S. patentee’s rights in the United States," he said.

Tuesday, December 01, 2015

[Supreme Court] Nautilus v. BioSig

http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/reasonable-certainty-regarding.html
Through a series of cases, the Federal Circuit has implemented was arguably a stiff test of indefiniteness – making it quite difficult to find a claim invalid as indefinite. As the Supreme Court writes:
According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the §112, ¶2 threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.”
In its opinion here, the Supreme Court found that the insolubly ambiguous fails to apply the statutory requirement noted above. In its place, the court has created a new test as follows:
A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art [at the time the patent was filed] about the scope of the invention. . . . .
The standard we adopt accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 270 (1916). . . .

Saturday, July 25, 2015

[Case law] Plaintiff’s Infringement Expert Disqualified Due to Prior Retention by Defendant

Case No. 2:13-CV-947-JRG-RSP

Memorandum Order

Rule)
As set out by the Fifth Circuit in Koch Refining Co. v. Boudreaux, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181
(5th Cir. 1996), in order to disqualify an expert witness, the moving party must show

- that it had an objectively reasonable basis for a confidential relationship with the expert, and

- that confidential information relevant to the instant case was disclosed to the expert during that prior
relationship.

Issue)
The real dispute centers around whether the prior work was relevant to the current case.

Fact)
On that point, the Court is heavily influenced by the fact that

- the parties agree that the same devices accused in this case were accused in the earlier matter.

- Furthermore, the time frames are nearly overlapping. Plaintiff has not been able to show that the issues do not also overlap.

- Furthermore, Defendant objected within days of learning of Bims’ involvement in this case and
was diligent in seeking disqualification.

- Finally, Plaintiff has not presented any statement from Bims explaining why his prior work is not relevant to the current case.

Conclusion)
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED

Thursday, May 28, 2015

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (template)

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102

Claims 1-7

Claims 1-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by [PA]. This rejection is respectfully traversed for the following reasons.

With respect to the Examiner's rejection, Applicant respectfully traverses the rejection on the basis that [PA] does not include all limitations as claimed.

/* Authority starts*/
MPEP § 2131 states that “‘[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently [See related post] described, in a single prior art reference.’ Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)” (emphasis added). “‘The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim.’ Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989)” (emphasis added). Moreover, “[e]very element of the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim.” Id. (emphasis added).
/* Authority ends*/

Therefore, to properly reject claims 1-7 under U.S.C. §102, the disclosure of [PA] must include each and every element and limitation as arranged therein.

Referring to the specification for the purposes of illustration only, embodiments of
the claimed invention relate to ". . . " See paragraphs [00**]-[00**] of the originally published specification.

Accordingly, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "

Meanwhile, [PA] discloses, in part, ". . . " See paragraph [0083] of [PA].

Applicant respectfully asserts that [PA] fails to disclose all of the limitations of
independent claim 1. Specifically, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "  [PA], however, is directed toward . . .   [PA] is silent with regard to . . . , as claimed, and is instead concerned with . . . ..

In view of the above, as [PA] fails to anticipate at least the aforementioned
limitation as required by independent claim 1, a rejection under § 102 cannot be supported. Thus,
independent claim 1 is patentable over [PA]. Independent claim 7 contains substantially similar
limitations and therefore is also patentable over [PA] for at least the same reasons. Dependent
claims are allowable for at least the same reasons. Accordingly, withdrawal of this rejection is
respectfully requested.

Conclusion
Applicant believes this reply is fully responsive to all outstanding issues and places this application  in condition for allowance.   If this  belief is incorrect, or other issues arise, the Examiner is encouraged to contact the undersigned or his associates at the telephone number listed
below.


Thursday, March 12, 2015

[Patently-O] Most Cited Supreme Court Patent Decisions (2005-2015)

  1. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness)
  2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctive relief)
  3. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (challenging licensed patents)
  4. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) (inducing infringement)
  5. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (subject matter eligibility)
  6. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (presumption of validity)
  7. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (tying)
  8. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (exhaustion)
  9. Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (infringement by export of components)
  10. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (post-verdict civil procedure requirements)
  11. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) (patent eligibility)
  12. Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (appellate jurisdiction)
  13. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (research exception to infringement)
  14. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013) (competition law – drug settlements)
  15. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059 (2013) (federal jurisdiction over cases involving patent law)
  16. Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014) (unfair competition based upon false infringement allegations)
  17. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) (indefiniteness)
  18. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 721 (2013) (standing after covenant not-to-sue)
  19. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (ownership under Bayh-Dole)
  20. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (subject matter eligibility)
  21. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) (subject matter eligibility)
  22. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014) (divided infringement)
  23. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S.Ct. 1670 (2012) (forcing correction of Orange Book listings)
KSR has actually rocketed to the position of most-cited Supreme Court patent case of all time followed by Markman (1996); U.S. Gypsom (1948) (antitrust-patent); Graham v. Deere (1966); and Warner-Jenkinson (1997).

Friday, February 20, 2015

[CAFC] Preamble - limiting? PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1396.Opinion.2-13-2015.1.PDF

"Just because an embodiment does not expressly disclose a feature does not mean that embodiment excludes that feature."

"However, in a case such as this, where the patent describes multiple embodiments, every claim does not need to cover every embodiment."

Monday, February 16, 2015

SS10. Basic exercise

- If notice is delivered in person or by certified mail with return receipt request, notice will be effective.
--> Notice will be effective only if it is delivered in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested.

- The court should presume that the administrator's functions have ceased only when evidence proves it.
--> Without contrary proof, the court should presume that the administrator's functions continue.

- If the administrator reviews the application and finds that it contain all the requisite materials, termination will be approved.
--> Termination will be approved only after the administrator reviews the application and finds it complete.

SS 9. Basic exercise

1. The court relied heavily on the district court's statement that (1) the would-be intervenors retained the right to appear through counsel, to participate in the fairness hearing, to conduct discovery, and (2) they had standing to appeal the court's approval or disapproval of the class-action settlement.

2. the identify of the parties

3. (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates ... , (3) affords

Friday, February 06, 2015

ss 8, writing exercise

- The plaintiff testified and so did three witnesses on behalf of the corporation.
Answer) After the plaintiff testified, three witnesses testified for the corporation.

-  The court should decide this purely legal question.
Answer) The court decides this purely legal question.

- The court should deny M's motion ...
Answer) The court should deny McCormick’s motion for partial summary judgment on the duty to defend.

- The court may disregard plaintiff's opposition because it violates ...
Answer)  The court should disregard Thompson’s opposition because it violates California Rule of Court 313.

Thursday, February 05, 2015

IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1301.Opinion.2-2-2015.1.PDF

Contrary to Cuozzo’s contention, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR. We affirm the Board’s final determination, finding no error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the Board’s obviousness determination, and the Board’s denial of Cuozzo’s motion to amend.