[Supreme Court] Nautilus v. BioSig

http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/reasonable-certainty-regarding.html

Through a series of cases, the Federal Circuit has implemented was arguably a stiff test of indefiniteness – making it quite difficult to find a claim invalid as indefinite. As the Supreme Court writes:

According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the §112, ¶2 threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.”

In its opinion here, the Supreme Court found that the insolubly ambiguous fails to apply the statutory requirement noted above. In its place, the court has created a new test as follows:

A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art [at the time the patent was filed] about the scope of the invention. . . . .

The standard we adopt accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 270 (1916). . . .

[Case law] Plaintiff’s Infringement Expert Disqualified Due to Prior Retention by Defendant

Case No. 2:13-CV-947-JRG-RSP

Memorandum Order

Rule)
As set out by the Fifth Circuit in Koch Refining Co. v. Boudreaux, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181
(5th Cir. 1996), in order to disqualify an expert witness, the moving party must show

- that it had an objectively reasonable basis for a confidential relationship with the expert, and

- that confidential information relevant to the instant case was disclosed to the expert during that prior
relationship.

Issue)
The real dispute centers around whether the prior work was relevant to the current case.

Fact)
On that point, the Court is heavily influenced by the fact that

- the parties agree that the same devices accused in this case were accused in the earlier matter.

- Furthermore, the time frames are nearly overlapping. Plaintiff has not been able to show that the issues do not also overlap.

- Furthermore, Defendant objected within days of learning of Bims’ involvement in this case and
was diligent in seeking disqualification.

- Finally, Plaintiff has not presented any statement from Bims explaining why his prior work is not relevant to the current case.

Conclusion)
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED

[Link] English Language and Usage

http://english.stackexchange.com/

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (template)

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102

Claims 1-7

Claims 1-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by [PA]. This rejection is respectfully traversed for the following reasons.

With respect to the Examiner's rejection, Applicant respectfully traverses the rejection on the basis that [PA] does not include all limitations as claimed.

/* Authority starts*/

MPEP § 2131 states that “‘[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently [See related post] described, in a single prior art reference.’ Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)” (emphasis added). “‘The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim.’ Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989)” (emphasis added). Moreover, “[e]very element of the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim.” Id. (emphasis added).

/* Authority ends*/

Therefore, to properly reject claims 1-7 under U.S.C. §102, the disclosure of [PA] must include each and every element and limitation as arranged therein.

Referring to the specification for the purposes of illustration only, embodiments of
the claimed invention relate to ". . . " See paragraphs [00**]-[00**] of the originally published specification.

Accordingly, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "

Meanwhile, [PA] discloses, in part, ". . . " See paragraph [0083] of [PA].

Applicant respectfully asserts that [PA] fails to disclose all of the limitations of
independent claim 1. Specifically, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "  [PA], however, is directed toward . . .   [PA] is silent with regard to . . . , as claimed, and is instead concerned with . . . ..

In view of the above, as [PA] fails to anticipate at least the aforementioned
limitation as required by independent claim 1, a rejection under § 102 cannot be supported. Thus,
independent claim 1 is patentable over [PA]. Independent claim 7 contains substantially similar
limitations and therefore is also patentable over [PA] for at least the same reasons. Dependent
claims are allowable for at least the same reasons. Accordingly, withdrawal of this rejection is
respectfully requested.

Conclusion
Applicant believes this reply is fully responsive to all outstanding issues and places this application  in condition for allowance.   If this  belief is incorrect, or other issues arise, the Examiner is encouraged to contact the undersigned or his associates at the telephone number listed
below.

Sites for English Learning

http://www.phrasemix.com/   (Very easy)

[Patently-O] Most Cited Supreme Court Patent Decisions (2005-2015)

http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/supreme-court-cases.html

1. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness)
2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctive relief)
3. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (challenging licensed patents)
4. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) (inducing infringement)
5. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (subject matter eligibility)
6. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (presumption of validity)
7. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (tying)
8. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (exhaustion)
9. Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (infringement by export of components)
10. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (post-verdict civil procedure requirements)
11. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) (patent eligibility)
12. Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (appellate jurisdiction)
13. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (research exception to infringement)
14. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013) (competition law – drug settlements)
15. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059 (2013) (federal jurisdiction over cases involving patent law)
16. Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014) (unfair competition based upon false infringement allegations)
17. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) (indefiniteness)
18. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 721 (2013) (standing after covenant not-to-sue)
19. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (ownership under Bayh-Dole)
20. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (subject matter eligibility)
21. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) (subject matter eligibility)
22. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014) (divided infringement)
23. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S.Ct. 1670 (2012) (forcing correction of Orange Book listings)

KSR has actually rocketed to the position of most-cited Supreme Court patent case of all time followed by Markman (1996); U.S. Gypsom (1948) (antitrust-patent); Graham v. Deere (1966); and Warner-Jenkinson (1997).

Litigation Databank

http://litigation.maxval-ip.com/

Litigation databank

[LTE] PDCCH, CCE

http://nitintayal-lte-tutorials.blogspot.com/2013/05/all-about-pdcch-and-cce-allocation.html

[CAFC] Preamble - limiting? PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1396.Opinion.2-13-2015.1.PDF

"Just because an embodiment does not expressly disclose a feature does not mean that embodiment excludes that feature."

"However, in a case such as this, where the patent describes multiple embodiments, every claim does not need to cover every embodiment."

LTE standards

http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/98-lte

http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/long-term-evolution

http://www.whatsag.com/G/Understanding_LTE.php

file:///C:/Users/mp071953/Downloads/the-lte-standard.pdf

http://www.comsocscv.org/docs/Talk_111109_MobileBroadband.pdf

http://www.extremetech.com/mobile/110711-what-is-lte

http://www.unwiredinsight.com/2012/3gpp-lte-releases

http://lte-tdd.org/

http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/cellulartelecomms/lte-long-term-evolution/lte-fdd-tdd-duplex.php

SS10. Basic exercise

- If notice is delivered in person or by certified mail with return receipt request, notice will be effective.
--> Notice will be effective only if it is delivered in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested.

- The court should presume that the administrator's functions have ceased only when evidence proves it.
--> Without contrary proof, the court should presume that the administrator's functions continue.

- If the administrator reviews the application and finds that it contain all the requisite materials, termination will be approved.
--> Termination will be approved only after the administrator reviews the application and finds it complete.

SS 9. Basic exercise

1. The court relied heavily on the district court's statement that (1) the would-be intervenors retained the right to appear through counsel, to participate in the fairness hearing, to conduct discovery, and (2) they had standing to appeal the court's approval or disapproval of the class-action settlement.

2. the identify of the parties

3. (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates ... , (3) affords

717 Madison Place Oral Arguments and the Federal Circuit

http://www.717madisonplace.com/

Free and low cost Patent Analysis Tool

http://ipassetmaximizerblog.com/free-and-low-cost-patent-search-and-analysis-tools-who-needs-expensive-name-brand-products/

http://thepatentanalyst.com/page/3/

http://www.intellogist.com/wiki/Main_Page

Citestack for Chrome

http://www.citestack.com/index.html

How to: 20 features you’ve never used in Word

http://www.pcauthority.com.au/Feature/374631,how-to-20-features-you8217ve-never-used-in-word.aspx

True.

ss 8, writing exercise

- The plaintiff testified and so did three witnesses on behalf of the corporation.
Answer) After the plaintiff testified, three witnesses testified for the corporation.

-  The court should decide this purely legal question.
Answer) The court decides this purely legal question.

- The court should deny M's motion ...
Answer) The court should deny McCormick’s motion for partial summary judgment on the duty to defend.

- The court may disregard plaintiff's opposition because it violates ...
Answer)  The court should disregard Thompson’s opposition because it violates California Rule of Court 313.

IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1301.Opinion.2-2-2015.1.PDF

Contrary to Cuozzo’s contention, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR. We affirm the Board’s final determination, finding no error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the Board’s obviousness determination, and the Board’s denial of Cuozzo’s motion to amend.

ss7 writing exercise

1. 1.      Ms. L… accrued considerable debt to her family and others, during her struggle to provide for her children as a single parent.

---> While struggling as a single parent to provide for her children, Ms. L… accrued considerable debt to her family and others.

1. 2.      Chesapeake incorrectly asserts that it is not a proper defendant in this case, and, therefore, that relief cannot be granted.

---> Chesapeake incorrectly asserts that it is not a proper defendant in this case, and that therefore relief cannot be granted.

1. 3.      The court ruled that Office McGee’s primary role is not law enforcement because he was acting more as a school employee than as a police officer.
2. --> Finding that Officer McGee was acting more as a school employee than as a police officer in searching Robinson, the court ruled that an official's primary role is not law enforcement.

P.21 ss6 writing exercise

1.  Appellee Allied Indemnity of New York respectfully suggests that oral argument should not be allowed because the Texas Supreme Court (in National Union case) and this Court (in Constitution State case) decided dispositive issue.

Also, the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments.

Oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process.

--> Oral argument would be of little benefit for two reasons.  First, the dispositive issue has recently been decided by the Texas Supreme Court ( ) and by this Court ( ). Second, the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and the record.

2.  No Kansas cases explicitly held that a corporation is required to have a valid business purpose to engage in certain transactions like mergers, consolidations, or a sale of assets followed by a dissolution and liquidation.  But, in a 1994 case involving a cash-out merger where the dissenters claimed the defendant's board of directors breached its fiduciary duties to the dissenters, the Supreme Court of Kansas cited as one of the trial court's holdings that a corporation does not need to show a valid corporate purpose of eliminating stockholders.  (88 words)

Answer) No Kansas cases explicitly hold that Kansas requires a corporation to have a valid business purpose to engage in certain specified transactions.  But in 1994 the Supreme Court of Kansas decided a case that bears on the question.  The case involved a cash-out merger in which the dissenters claimed that the defendant's board of directors breached its fiduciary duties to them.  The court found that a corporation need not show a valid corporate purpose of eliminating stockholders.

3.  The court of appeals noted that the EPA had issued a permit for the applicant to discharge wastewater that would occur from the outfall pipe.  Holders of the permit are generally exempted from complying with the EIS requirement.  Accordingly, the Corps, a holder of the permit, did not need to analyze the environmental implications of the discharges from the outfall pipe and instead considered only the construction and maintenance of the pipeline itself.  The court held that the issuance of the permit is not a major federal action.   

--> The court of appeals cited two salient points.

P.18 writing exercise. ss5

1. Even if the fog caused injury to Roelke, Amskills had no duty to prevent the injury that Amskills could not have been expected to foresee.

--> Even assuming that the fog caused Roelke's accident, Amskills had no duty to prevent such a freakish and unforeseeable injury.

2.  Before the initial offering, the underwriters, any officers, directors, or employees did not know any facts suggesting that "Palm Harbor" could not be completed on schedule and in accordance with specifications.

--> Before the initial offering, no one knew or had reason to know that Palm Harbor could not be timely completed in accordance with specifications.

3.  Beale failed to allege facts to establish that competition among the nation's law schools would be reduced or that the public has been in any way injured. Thus, her restraint-of-trade claim would be dismissed.

--> Beale has not alleged facts that, if true, would establish either public injury or reduced competition among the nation's law schools.  Thus, her restraint-of-trade claim must be dismissed.

4.  The Business Corporation law address that a New York corporation indemnifies only its employees.

--> The Business Corporation law does not address whether a New York corporation can indemnify nonemployees.

5.  The court stated that a duty to disclose the illegal conduct of persons who seek election to a public office through political campaigns exists in only a few instances of the cases it examined.

--> The court examined many cases and found few that imposed a duty to disclose the illegal conduct of candidates for elected office.

Headings for email memo

Issue and Answer,  
Summary of Law,
Impact on Client

source: http://sites.utexas.edu/legalwriting/

Writing exercise ss 3.

1)      In March 2000, Gilbert Spaulding applied to the Workforce Commission for extended unemployment benefits.  Because those benefits were not available during the period for which he sought eligibility, the Workforce Commission denied Spaulding’s request and the lower court correctly affirmed the denial.

(    

      M. Answer) In March 2000, Gilbert Spaulding applied to the Workforce Commission for extended unemployment benefits.  The commission denied the request because those benefits were not available during the period for which he sought eligibility. The trial court affirmed.

2)      The plaintiff, Pilsen Corporation, had only requested a partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of fraud.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court’s grant of the summary judgment.  However, the state supreme court reversed the affirmation.

     M. Answer)  Plaintiff, Pilsen Corporation, moved for a partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of fraud.  The trial court affirmed the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.  On further appeal, however, the state supreme court reversed.

3)      For three years Davis Energy has had a guard . . .  own property.  Under these circumstances, the issue is whether …

     M. Answer)  Davis Energy owns a fuel-storage yard that can be reached only by a private road.  For seven years, owners of adjacent lots have used the road to reach their property.  For the past three years, Davis has had a guard at the road's entrance but has posted no other notice about private property or permission to enter.  Has Davis, through its actions or silence, granted its neighbors an easement to use the road?

4)      Before 1958, the plaintiff Los Angeles Dodgers, the owner of a professional baseball team, played baseball in Brooklyn, New York, under the name “the Brooklyn Dodgers.”  In 1958, the plaintiff had offices in Los Angles, California, where it has played baseball since then.

      M. Answer)  Plaintiff Los Angeles Dodgers, a corporation owning a professional baseball team, began in New York as the Brooklyn Dodgers.  In 1958, the team moved the site of its home games from New York to California and changed its names to the Los Angeles Dodgers.  The organization's principal corporate offices are now in Los Angeles.

Learner's dictionary

http://www.learnersdictionary.com/

Legible

http://sites.utexas.edu/legalwriting/

Optimizing Microsoft Word for LRW

http://www.persuasiveauthority.com/2013/03/19/optimizing-microsoft-word-for-lrw/

To the extent it is determined to be necessary to include A in B,

Patent No. 6,071,103
Petition For Inter Partes Review

Although not believed to be real-parties-in-interest in the present Petition, out of an abundance of caution, Petitioner notes that it expects that a substantially similar petition is being filed by Nissan North America, Inc. To the extent it is determined to be necessary to include parties interested in that petition in the present Petition, the additional real-parties-in-interest are listed in the contemporaneously filed petition by Nissan North America, Inc. et al.

Northern California IP blog

http://blogs.orrick.com/norcal-ip/

by Orrick.

Legal citation plugin software

https://www.zotero.org/download/

http://lawlibraryguides.bu.edu/c.php?g=14784&p=79878#5776769

http://ica.library.oregonstate.edu/tutorials/631--Advanced-Zotero

Patent word geek

http://patentwordgeek.com/

102 - Anticipation

2131 Anticipation — Application of 35 U.S.C.
102 [R-11.2013]

A claimed invention may be rejected under 35
U.S.C. 102 when the invention is anticipated (or is
“not novel”) over a disclosure that is available as
prior art. To anticipate a claim, the disclosure must
teach every element of the claim.
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every
element as set forth in the claim is found, either
expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of
California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051,
1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “When a claim covers several
structures or compositions, either generically or as
alternatives, the claim is deemed anticipated if any
of the structures or compositions within the scope
of the claim is known in the prior art.” Brown v.
3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351, 60 USPQ2d 1375, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim to a system for setting a
computer clock to an offset time to address the Year
2000 (Y2K) problem, applicable to records with year
date data in “at least one of two-digit, three-digit, or
four-digit” representations, was held anticipated by
a system that offsets year dates in only two-digit
formats). See also MPEP § 2131.02. “The identical
invention must be shown in as complete detail as is
contained in the ... claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913,
1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be
arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an
ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology
is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15
USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Note that, in some
circumstances, it is permissible to use multiple references in a 35 U.S.C. 102 rejection. See MPEP
§ 2131.01.

2131.05   Nonanalogous or Disparaging Prior Art [R-08.2012]

“Arguments that the alleged anticipatory prior art is ‘nonanalogous art’ or ‘teaches away from the invention’ or is not recognized as solving the problem solved by the claimed invention, [are] not ‘germane’ to a rejection under section 102.” Twin Disc, Inc.v. United States, 231 USPQ 417, 424 (Cl. Ct. 1986) (quoting In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1, 7 (CCPA 1982)). See also State Contracting & Eng’ g Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1068, 68 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (The question of whether a reference is analogous art is not relevant to whether that reference anticipates. A reference may be directed to an entirely different problem than the one addressed by the inventor, or may be from an entirely different field of endeavor than that of the claimed invention, yet the reference is still anticipatory if it explicitly or inherently discloses every limitation recited in the claims.).

A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it. The question whether a reference “teaches away” from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis. Celeritas Technologies Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 USPQ2d 1516, 1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The prior art was held to anticipate the claims even though it taught away from the claimed invention. “The fact that a modem with a single carrier data signal is shown to be less than optimal does not vitiate the fact that it is disclosed.”). See Upsher-Smith Labs. v. Pamlab, LLC, 412 F.3d 1319, 1323, 75 USPQ2d 1213, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(claimed composition that expressly excluded an ingredient held anticipated by reference composition that optionally included that same ingredient); see also Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1349, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Claimed composition was anticipated by prior art reference that inherently met claim limitation of “sufficient aeration” even though reference taught away from air entrapment or purposeful aeration.).

PTAB / BPAI data site

http://www.patentboardferret.com/

http://www.ptab.us

Double Patenting

• Types of Double Patenting Rejections

nStatutory (35 U.S.C. 101) Double Patenting:

n Is There an Embodiment that Falls Within the Scope of One Claim, but Not the Other?

n   Could One Claim be Literally Infringed Without Literally Infringing the Other Claim?

--> If Examined claim and claim of potentially conflicting patent or application DO NOT exactly match in scope – DO NOT make a statutory (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection.

 

nNon-Statutory Double Patenting

nRejection based on obviousness analysis

nAnalogous to 35 U.S.C. 103 Analysis

nDetermine the Scope and Content of the Claims in the Conflicting Patent or Application

nAscertain the Differences Between the Claims in the Conflicting Patent or Application and the Claim in Issue

nResolve the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

nEvaluate Evidence of Secondary Considerations

nRejection based on anticipation analysis

nNon-Statutory Double Patenting Based Solely on Improper Timewise Extension of Patent Rights

* 35 U.S.C. 121 does not prohibit the rejection because xxx patent is a CIP of xxx patent.  If it is a divisional, a non-statutory DP rejection would not be proper.

Obviousness Analysis – Written Rejection

nAny Non-Statutory Double Patenting Rejection Based on an Obviousness Analysis Should Make Clear:

nThe differences between a claim in the examined application compared to a claim in the reference patent (or copending application)

nThe reasons for concluding that the invention defined in the claim at issue would have been an obvious variation of the invention defined in a claim in the patent (or copending application)

How to Overcome a Proper Double Patenting Rejection

n Statutory (35 U.S.C. 101) Double Patenting

nAmend the claim(s)

nCancel the claim(s)

nA terminal disclaimer is NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

nDeclarations under 37 CFR 1.131 are NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

n Non-Statutory Double Patenting (All Types)

nAmend the claim(s)

nCancel the claim(s)

nFile a proper terminal disclaimer

nDeclarations under 37 CFR 1.131 are NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

"Based on" vs. "On the basis of"

The phrases based on and on the basis of are often used interchangeably but should not be, because based on is a participle (a verbal adjective), which can define a noun, pronoun and noun phrase (but not a verb) whereas on the basis of is a prepositional phrase, which can define a verb. Examples of the different information transmitted by their correct usage are [The administration sent a document based on your suggestion] and [The administration sent a document on the basis of your suggestion]. In the former, based on rightly describes the nearest noun (a document) and so tells us that you had something to do with the content of the document; in the latter, on the basis of describes the verb (to send) and tells us that the idea of sending the document (rather than perhaps taking it in person) was yours.


http://www.asiaandro.com/ec/EC4.pdf

MS Word shortcut - indent and others

• Ctrl+M / Ctrl+Shift+M :  increase / decrease indent

• Tab: Go to the ‘File’ tab, and click on ‘Options’. From the list on the left, choose ‘Proofing’. Now, under ‘AutoCorrect options’, click on the ‘AutoCorrect Options…’ button. In the window which appears, click on the ‘AutoFormat As You Type’ tab. Select the ‘Set left- and first-indent with tabs and backspaces’ checkbox. Press the ‘OK’ button twice, and you’re done!

•  For anyone who cares, to change list level up, ALT+SHIFT+Right Arrow. To change it down a level, ALT+SHIFT+Left Arrow.

Patent Damages

http://patent-damages.com

Essential Patent Blog

http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/

Admissibility of Settlement-Related Evidence at Trial

FRE 408

Market Share approach

State Industries v. Mor-Flo Indus.  Fed Cir 1989.

The prevailing method for calculating lost profits damages in patent infringement originated with State Industries v. Mor-Flo1 in the late 1980s.

That decision established both the “market share” rule for lost sales and use of the split award.2

 The market share rule considers that portion of the patent holder’s relevant market that has been captured by the infringing firm.3 In the simplest two-firm model the market share rule assumes that the patent holder would capture all the infringing revenue.4

 

When the market also includes non-infringing alternatives, the market share rule divides the infringing sales among the patent holder and the non-infringing firms in proportion to their respective market shares.5

The split award includes a reasonable royalty to the patent holder for the infringing sales allocated to the non-infringing firms (the split award is not used with a two-firm market).6  The logic of State Industries therefore treats each infringing sale in the relevant market as either a lost sale for the patent holder or a basis for a royalty payment.7

Case laws related patent damages calculation

1.  Presidio Components v. Am. Tech.  (Fed Cir)

2. Rite-Hite v. Kelley

3. Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc.

Two limitations on patent damages- Six Year and Notice

Subject: Two limitations on patent damages- Six Year and Notice

* The Six Year limitation

35 U.S.C. §286 provides that "no recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action."

* The Notice limitation

35 U.S.C. §287(a) provides for notice to the public by marking the patented article. If the patentee fails to mark its patents, it cannot recover damages in any infringement action, unless “the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter[.]”  Filing an infringement action is such notice.

1) Process or Method claims

The marking provision of § 287(a) does not apply to patents claiming only processes or methods. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  In cases where the patent claims are directed to only a method or process, there is nothing to mark. Id; see also Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

2) Apparatus and Method claims

When the patentee asserts both apparatus and method claims and to the extent that there is a tangible item to mark (i.e., a physical device produced by the claimed method), the notice provision applies.  Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

ResQnet

http://www.tiplj.org/wp-content/uploads/Volumes/v20/v20p181.pdf

a) ResQNet
In ResQnet, ResQNet’s (the patentee) expert relied on seven prior licenses as a “starting point” in determining the reasonable
royalty.51 Five of the licenses were “re-bundling” licenses, permitting the licensees to re-brand the patentee’s software, *192
re-bundle it with the licensee’s own products, and resell the newly-bundled products.52 In addition, the licenses included
services such as technical support and training, and did not specifically mention the patent at issue in the lawsuit.53 ResQNet
failed to offer evidence that the software in these re-bundling licenses (or the users of the software) practiced the patented
method.54 These licenses had a large sliding-royalty rate (a rate that changed depending on various circumstances).55

The Federal Circuit contrasted the large royalty rates in the re-bundling licenses, which showed “no discernible link to the
claimed technology,” with the lower royalty rates in the remaining two licenses, which arose out of litigation.56 Without
evidence of the link, if any, between the re-bundling licenses and the patented method, those re-bundling licenses were
essentially useless as evidence of a reasonable royalty.57 The patent-in-suit dealt “with a method of communicating between
host computers and remote terminals--not training, marketing, and customer support services. The re-bundling licenses
simply ha[d] no place in this case.”58

According to the majority, ResQNet’s expert relied almost exclusively on the first Georgia-Pacific factor--prior licenses of
the patent-in-suit--in evaluating the reasonable royalty.59 Consequently, after the Federal Circuit held that the trial court
should have disregarded the re-bundling licenses, only the two litigation licenses remained as potential damages evidence.60
The court observed in dicta “that the most reliable license in this record arose out of litigation,” but also noted that “litigation
itself can skew the results of the hypothetical negotiation.”61 On remand, *193 the district court would have to reconsider the
reasonable royalty calculation, and it “should not rely on unrelated licenses to increase the reasonable royalty rate above rates
more clearly linked to the economic demand for the claimed technology.”62 In concluding, the Federal Circuit faulted the
district court for relying on the re-bundling licenses “without any factual findings that accounted for the technological and
economic differences between those licenses and the [patent-in-suit].”63 A district court “must consider licenses that are
commensurate with what the defendant has appropriated.”64

In dissent, Judge Newman accused the majority of “creat[ing] a new rule whereby no licenses involving the patented
technology can be considered . . . if the patents themselves are not directly licensed or if the licenses include subject matter in
addition to that which was infringed by the defendant here.”65 The district court recognized that none of the licenses in
evidence was “a perfect approximation of the hypothetical license between ResQNet and Lansa.”66 Judge Newman noted that
“it is not necessary that the identical situation existed in past transactions, for the trier of fact to determine the value of the
injury,”67 and he accused the majority of depriving the fact-finder of relevant information.68

The majority in ResQNet did not hold that a district court may never consider “any licenses involving the technology of [the
patents-in-suit] bundled with additional technologies, such as software code.”69 Rather, the majority took issue with the
district court’s “considering ResQNet’s re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust upward the reasonable royalty without any
factual findings that accounted for the technological and economic differences between those licenses and the [infringed
patent].”70 The majority in ResQNet noted that reasonable royalty damages must be “carefully tie[d] . . . to the claimed
invention’s footprint in the marketplace,”71 and “[a]ny evidence unrelated to the claimed invention does not support *194
compensation for infringement.”72 Where licenses are “radically different from the hypothetical agreement under
consideration,” they are generally not competent proof of damages.73

Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F. 2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10790214856684669985&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F. 2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

Patent Damages

A

If successful in an infringement suit, a patent owner may recover actual damages or at least a reasonable royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982). Where the patentee produces or sells a product (or service) covered by the patent claims, the patentee may seek to recover damages based on a theory of lost profits because the amount is likely to be greater than reasonable royalties.

To recover damages on the theory of "lost profits", a patentee must show that, but for the infringement, it would have made the infringer's sales. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864, 226 USPQ 402, 409-10 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied,475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). This requirement of causation implicates the patentee's manufacturing capacity and marketing capability, the desires of customers for the claimed invention, the relationship of the claimed invention to the product sold and other factors pertinent to the particular market or parties. Causation is most easily found where only two companies, the patentee and the infringer, are in the market. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc.,761 F.2d 649, 653, 225 USPQ 985, 987 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88 L.Ed.2d 229 (1985).

Where there is evidence of a third party competitor, the lost profits theory would appear to be nonviable inasmuch as the third party could have made the sale rather than the patentee. Under such circumstances, there appears to be no possible causation. However, such is not the law.

Patentees have successfully urged modifications to the basic damage theory so as to cover situations other than the simple two-supplier market. There is precedent for finding causation despite an alternative source of supply if that source is an infringer or puts out a noninfringing product that is an unacceptable alternative, or has insignificant sales. See, e.g., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,739 F.2d 604, 222 USPQ 654 (Fed.Cir.) (proof of no acceptable substitutes), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed.2d 405 (1984); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 222 USPQ 4 (Fed.Cir.1984) (no alternative competing source where only four or five machines sold); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 220 USPQ 490 (Fed.Cir.1983) (no acceptable alternatives because, inter alia, scale of operations of others was insignificant). Other litigants have been held entitled to lost profits damages calculated on a portion of an infringer's sales based on the patentee's market share. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577-78, 12 USPQ2d 1026, 1029 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 744 (U.S.1990). These various theories are all invoked here to justify discovery from K-Flow of its products, comparative test results, sales figures, customers' names, and the like, to enable Micro Motion to determine which version or versions of the various lost profits damage theories to pursue.

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unquestionably allow broad discovery, a right to discovery is not unlimited. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 391, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). As a matter of procedure, to secure protection from discovery, a nonparty may invoke the inherent power of the court, see 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, § 45.05[3], at 37 (2d ed.1989), or Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b), if appropriate, to quash a subpoena. Under Rule 45(d), a nonparty subpoenaed for testimony and production 1323*1323 of documents may move for a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), including an order that discovery not be had. Confidential commercial information warrants special protection under Rule 26(c)(7). Smith & Wesson v. United States, 782 F.2d 1074, 1082 (1st Cir.1986). A nonparty also may merely object to production of documents and things. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(1). By merely objecting, such discovery is foreclosed except pursuant to an order of the court. Id. Also, Rule 26(d), which pertains to controlling the sequence and timing of discovery, may be invoked as a mechanism for accommodating the competing interests of those involved in the discovery process, for example, by delaying discovery on damages until liability is established. Cf. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 53 S.Ct. 736, 77 L.Ed. 1449 (1933).

While the burdens may vary somewhat depending on which rule or procedure is invoked, the substantive considerations for denying a party discovery are generally the same and may be gleaned from Rule 26(b), (c) and (g). Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d at 1210-11, 2 USPQ2d at 1036-37; American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 739-42, 3 USPQ2d 1817, 1820-23 (Fed.Cir.1987); Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d at 1023-26, 228 USPQ at 931-33. Discovery may not be had regarding a matter which is not "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Even if relevant, discovery is not permitted where no need is shown, or compliance would be unduly burdensome, or where harm to the person from whom discovery is sought outweighs the need of the person seeking discovery of the information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d at 739-42, 3 USPQ2d at 1820-23. Rule 26(g) specifically requires that the party or his attorney seeking discovery must certify that he has made a "reasonable inquiry" that the request is warranted. This "reasonable inquiry" is also imposed by Rule 11. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules — 1983 Amendment ("Discovery motions, however, fall within the ambit of Rule 11."); see also Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir.1988) (noting that Rule 26(g) "imposes a more stringent certification requirement than Rule 11" because a discovery request usually pertains to more specific subject matter than that covered under Rule 11). Each of the requests here is improper under one or more of these protective grounds.

CAFC Advisory Council

Link:  http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/advisory-council.html

ATRIP

International Association for  the Advancement of  Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property

ATRIP

Patent Tools

Patent Tools

The American Society of Legal Writers

http://www.scribes.org/

Useful sites for writing

http://plainlanguagenetwork.org/Resources/index.html

http://www.techcommunicators.com/pdfs/style-diction.pdf

Claim Construction database

http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/fedcir/claim_construction/

Claim Preclusion = Res Judicata

http://www.caught.net/prose/resjud.htm

It's always hard to distinguish two mouthful concepts; Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.

Here is a short summary; Claim Preclusion = Res Judicata whereas Issue Preclusion = Collateral Estoppel.

Shortcut to memorize this is that there should be only one "C" in each equation.

[ABA] Legal Writing: Ten Tips from the Trenches

http://www.abanet.org/yld/tyl/july10/writing.html

How to write like Elena Kagan

As a non-native, English writing would be my life-time burden.

As a way of improving writing, I sometimes study other persons' writing styles. One of sources I heavily rely on is LegalWritingPro.

Here's the material I received from the website;

http://www.legalwritingpro.com/articles/elena-kagan.pdf

WP's coverage on Supreme Court

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/package/supremecourt/index.html

Transcript of Senate's hearing about Comcast/NBC merger

Question - Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota)

Answer - Brian Roberts (CEO of Comcast)

March, 11, 2010. Senate Commerce committee's hearing.

Senator: I know a lot of lawyers are looking at this deal. But I just thought I'd run through a few things that I heard and people raised with me about concerns. One is that NBC and its affiliates have succeeded in by getting its programmings to as many viewers as possible and providing its contents. ... for free over -the-air and over-the-internet. Will Comcast use NBC's 31% stakes in Hulu.com to restrict selection of NBC programming that is available in Hulu.com and NBC.com?

Brian Roberts: No. I've never even personally met with the Hulu team. We own about 31% in non-controlling stake. We have no intention of changing NBC's relationship with Hulu. And, Hulu itself, from what I read in the presses, is going through business model reviews and how-to funded and what the future will be. We are not at that table and I look forward to learning more about that business once we get together if we do get together.

Senator: Do you expect Comcast to block any NBC content from the Internet and what about charging subscribers' fees?

Brian Roberts: Comcast does not want to block NBC content or, frankly, block any content on the Internet. And ... my vision is that a content creator in different windows has different business models. Sometimes they wanna pay-per-view like in movie theatres and sometimes you do that in your home. Sometimes it's ad-supported only. Sometimes it's a part of subscription. And who knows what other business models will come out in the future. From Comcast's perspective, my vision is to ,technologically, create a platform to make sure that contents are not pirated or it's authentic(ated) and finding a way to let content companies create their own business models that work for their businesses into the future.

Case Log at the Supreme Court

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/supremecourtopinions/2009-09-30-supreme-court-cases_N.htm

Journal submission guideline

http://stu.findlaw.com/journals/ip_and_cyberspace.html


1. JPTOS

The Editors welcome the submission of articles consistent with the Journal's stated objectives.
Receipt of manuscripts will be acknowledged and authors will be further advised as to whether or not their papers are acceptable for publication. Upon publication authors will be sent two (2) complimentary copies of the issue in which their article appears. All articles published will be automatically considered for the Rossman Award.

» All manuscripts must be typewritten, double-spaced and should preferably be submitted in duplicate.

» Authors are encouraged to submit their manuscripts on disc and/or e-mail

» To expedite publication fax this license grant to 571-273-6887 once it is filled out and signed.

» If you have questions about requirements for, or how to submit, a manuscript you may contact Jeffrey Gellner, Editor-In-Chief.

» Printer's deadline does not permit forwarding of galley proofs to authors for their corrections.

» Proof-reading is a responsibility of The JPTOS.


Send Articles to Editor at:

Jeffrey Gellner
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
P.O. BOX 2600
ARLINGTON,VA 22202

2. NC (http://jolt.unc.edu/)

Submission Policies

The Journal welcomes articles, notes and comments for publication. Shorter pieces are welcomed for consideration in our online edition. NC JOLT publishes two hardcopy issues per year, as well as a rolling publication online edition. Professors and practitioners are encouraged to submit papers on contemporary issues in the fields of law, science, and technology. The Journal also welcomes suggestions for future topics of research.

Submissions may be made via e-mail or US mail, and must be accompanied by the author’s address, telephone number, fax number, and email address. Please indicate if the item has been previously published or is under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Email submissions

The document may be sent as an email attachment, complete with abstract, to submissions@ncjolt.org

US mail submissions:

Submissions should include two hardcopies and a disk copy of the article. The disk copy must be in MS Word or WordPerfect format. The disk should be labeled with the author’s name and the filename of the document. Materials submitted for consideration will not be returned.

Please forward materials to:

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Journal of Law and Technology
Van-Hecke Wettach Hall
CB # 3380
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599

Format

Papers must not exceed 45 double spaced pages including footnotes and endnotes, which should also be double spaced. An abstract of approximately 250 words and a table of contents is required. All submissions must conform to The Chicago Manual of Style (14th Ed.) and The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (18th Ed.).

For further information contact a JOLT editor by e-mailing submissions@ncjolt.org.

3. VA http://www.vjolt.net/submit.php

Submissions Guidelines

The Journal is pleased to accept submissions from members of the legal and scientific communities with experience and insights into issues at the intersection of the law and technology.

We prefer to receive submissions by email for the sake of mutual convenience. Please attach the article as Word document or PDF along with a résumé or C.V., a cover letter if desired, and a brief abstract of the article (<250>

We are also happy to accept submissions through ExpressO, an electronic submission service of the Berkeley Electronic Press, and through SSRN, an electronic submission service administered by the Social Science Research Network. We do not accept hard copy submissions by postal mail.

Thank you for your interest in the Virginia Journal of Law & Technology.

4. NW http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/submissions.htm

The Editors of the Journal welcome submissions for publication consideration.

Deadline:

All manuscripts sent by e-mail and post for consideration by the Journal are evaluated on a rolling basis. Upon request, the Journal may grant expedited reviews providing authors with a decision within 48 hours of submission. Please contact Tamera Kennard or Ryan Phelan, Executive Editors, for the Journal’s expedited review policy.

Contact Information:

Please send your submission electronically, by e-mailing the manuscript as a Word attachment to njtip@nlaw.northwestern.edu, or mail it to the following address:

Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property
Northwestern University School of Law
357 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611-3069

Format:

All submissions should be double-spaced with one-inch margins. The Journal uses Microsoft Word for all word-processing. Accordingly, all manuscripts must be submitted in Microsoft Word format. If you are submitting via postal mail, the Journal requests that you supply and submit one paper copy of the manuscript and one electronic copy on a 3 1/2 inch PC-compatible floppy disk or a PC-compatible CD-ROM. All footnoted text should be double-spaced and numbered serially. The journal uses footnote standard citing, and all footnotes and citations to authority should conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, Eighteenth Edition, published by the Harvard Law Review Association.

Content:

The Editors of the Journal seek submissions in the area of intellectual property law - particularly copyrights, entertainment law, Internet law, patents, comments on pending legislation or recent IP case decisions, telecommunications, trademarks, and trade secrets. In addition to notes, comments, and scholarly articles, we are also accepting submissions of shorter, approximately 500-2,000 word "perspectives" pieces. Examples of perspectives pieces include a short comment on a recent important development or issue in IP law, or an analysis of an interesting current IP case. Our Journal is published online, and the scholarly articles, case notes, comments, and working papers will be disseminated in electronic search databases such as LexisNexis and Westlaw.

Publication:

It is the policy of the Journal not to publish articles that have appeared or are to appear in other publications. Accordingly, all manuscripts should be submitted with the understanding that the Journal possesses the exclusive right of original publication. For various clerical reasons, the Journal requests that each author assign copyright to the Northwestern University School of Law for the collected work. While permitting the author unlimited use of the article, it offers the author the ordinary copyright protection. Copyrights will be taken out in the name of Northwestern University School of Law, and requests for permission to reprint your article will be processed by Northwestern University School of Law. A total of twenty-five reprints are supplied gratis to the author or authors of each article. Additional reprints may be obtained by arrangement with the Editors of the Journal prior to publication, or by arrangement with the printer after publication.

Questions:

Please direct all inquiries to Kenneth Jenq or Jessica Talati, Executive Editors.

5. John Marshall

http://www.jcil.org/journal/submission/index.html

Manuscript Submission

The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law is always looking to publish new and innovative articles regarding the latest issues in information technology and privacy law. The Journal therefore welcomes unsolicited manuscripts, either in hard-copy format or through electronic mail. Additionally, due to the fact the Journal is a quarterly publication, it accepts articles on a rolling basis throughout the year.

The Journal requests that any submitted manuscripts conform to the following requirements.

Citations

The preferred citation style of manuscripts conforms to The Bluebook Uniform System of Citation, 18th Edition.

Submissions

Electronic Submissions

• Electronic copies of manuscripts are preferred.
• Please e-mail files in Microsoft Word or rich text format.
• If compressing files, please use the Zip compression standard.
• Please include a copy of your resume.

Hard Copy Submissions

If submitting a hard copy of a manuscript, please send a resume and two copies of the manuscript to:

The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law
Attn: Solicitation Editor
315 S. Plymouth Court
Chicago, IL 60604

Timeframe & Notice

The Journal makes every attempt to send an acknowledgement of the receipt of any manuscript within forty-eight hours of receiving it. The Journal also makes every attempt to notify a manuscript author within two weeks of receiving a submission as to whether the Journal will publish the article.

If you do not receive an acknowledgement that your submission has been received or as to the submission's status for possible publication, please do not hesitate to contact a Solicitation Editor at 5jcil@stu.jmls.edu.

Call for Papers

The Journal is considering articles for publication in future issues. In addition to our already broad topic range, we are currently seeking articles examining President Obama's technology agenda. As this new administration implements policies and programs integrating technology, it will affect individuals, businesses, education, information accessibility, science, healthcare, communication, the environment, and the economy. A complete treatment of any of these topics should include a description and analysis of the relevant technology and a discussion of the implications for individuals, groups, or other countries. Ideally, submissions should offer suggestions on how to proceed on any issues discussed. For more information, contact the Journal's Solicitation Editor at 5jcil@stu.jmls.edu.

Additional Questions

If you have any additional questions regarding Journal submissions, please e-mail the Journal and direct all questions to either one of the Solicitation Editors or the Editor-in-Chief.

Thank you for your interest in the John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law.

6. Suffolk http://www.law.suffolk.edu/highlights/stuorgs/jhtl/submit/index.html

SUBMIT

Article Submissions

Articles published in the Journal of High Technology Law (JHTL) are submitted by judges, legal scholars, and other authorities in various fields of law. Lead Articles should be scholarly in style and contain incisive analysis, informed opinion, and content of interest to the legal community. JHTL seeks a diversity of subject matter and occasionally accepts an article focusing on issues from broader social perspectives in addition to articles reflecting traditional legal analyses.

JHTL carefully considers each manuscript received. Upon submission, the Lead Articles Department reviews the article and tentatively decides whether it is of publishable quality. After preliminary research about the author and the area of law covered by the article, the Lead Articles Editors, in conjunction with the Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor, decide whether to extend an offer to the author. If the author accepts, JHTL members check the substantive and technical accuracy of the piece, and make grammatical and stylistic suggestions. Although JHTL defers to authors in stylistic matters, the editorial board cannot sacrifice the substantive and technical accuracy of articles.

You may submit articles to the Journal of High Technology Law via email or standard mail. Footnotes should conform to the standards set forth in The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (18th ed. 2005). Please visit these Web sites for more information on The Bluebook citation standards:

www.legalbluebook.com
www.law.cornell.edu/citation

Submissions by Email
Send an email with an attached copy of your article as a Microsoft Word document to articles@jhtl.org. Please include your full name, institution, professional position, mailing address, and telephone number(s).

Submissions by Mail
Send one copy of your article with a cover letter containing the above contact information to the following address:

Lead Articles Editor

Journal of High Technology Law Suffolk University Law School Suite 450B 120 Tremont Street Boston, MA 02108

Grammar: Articles

http://www.eslbase.com/grammar/articles

I had difficulty in writing correct articles in right positions.

Interview Method

http://www.law.ou.edu/career/handouts/Building%20Interview%20Skills.pdf

I like this kind of change.

Texas Bar Exam format

The exam lasts three days.
On day one, a Procedure/Evidence exam and one 90-minute Multistate Performance Test question are given.
On day two, the Multistate Bar Exam is administered.
On day three, twelve essay questions are given.

The MBE counts for 40%.
The essay questions count for 40%.
The MPT counts for 10%.
The Procedure/Evidence exam counts for 10%.

Journals for publication

Journal of the Patent & Trademark Office Society
North Carolina,
Virginia,
Northwestern,
John Marshall
Suffolk.