[PTAB] Board Trial Rules and Practice Guide

https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/resources/board-trial-rules-and-practice

• Trial Practice Guide: 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,765–66 (Aug. 14, 2012) (“Practice Guide”), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/boards/bpai/trial_practice_guide_74_fr_48756_081412.pdf
• Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/2016-07381-1.pdf

• Motion to Amend (filed by Patent Owner) (37 C.F.R. § 42.121(a)): MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. RealD, Inc., https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/MasterImage%203D%20v%20RealD%20IPR2015-00040_Paper%2042.pdf

• Testimony Guidelines: Appendix D of the Trial Practice Guide.

[CAFC] Lexmark v. Impression Products

http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/02/21/cafc-reaffirms-patent-exhaustion-doctrine-lexmark-v-impression-products/id=66314/

[Immigration] Fee Waivers for Naturalization: Eligibility, Workshop Issues, Problem Areas

Fee Waivers for Naturalization: Eligibility, Workshop Issues, Problem Areas

 https://cliniclegal.org/resources/webinars/fee-waivers-naturalization

Reissue and Supplemental Exam

http://www.asiaiplaw.com/article/41/2353/

http://bciptf.org/?p=1738

http://www.postgrantproceedings.com/resources/articles/Article-NYM_Reissue_v_Supplemental_Exam.html

http://media.straffordpub.com/products/patent-reissue-strategic-use-after-aia-2013-10-31/presentation.pdf

References - Email writing

http://abovethelaw.com/2014/07/beyond-biglaw-how-to-send-good-emails/

http://sites.utexas.edu/legalwriting/2014/12/08/how-to-write-an-e-mail-memo/

http://www.vault.com/blog/vaults-law-blog-legal-careers-and-industry-news/law-firm-emails/

E-mail writing - Best Practices by ABA

http://www.americanbar.org/publications/young_lawyer/2011-12/december_2011/before_you_click_send_email_best_practices_lawyers.html

Before You Click “Send” E-mail best practices for Lawyers

Vol. 16 No. 3

ByLaura Graham

Laura Graham is an associate professor of Legal Writing at Wake Forest University School of Law. She can be contacted at grahamlp@wfu.edu.

For most attorneys, e-mail is a staple of law practice. In fact, in a recent survey of lawyers conducted by the ABA, 97 percent of attorneys said they used e-mail for routine correspondence, and over 70 percent said they used it for case status reports, memoranda, and briefs. Do these attorneys always take care to craft effective, error-free, and professional e-mails before they click “send”? Or do their e-mails sometimes reflect a rush to meet a deadline, a perception that e-mail isn’t “real writing,” or even instances of unprofessionalism, all of which can negatively impact them and their clients?

Attorneys can’t afford to view e-mail as an informal form of communication that warrants less time and attention than other legal documents. The recipients of your e-mails are evaluating your credibility, as well as your employer’s credibility, based on the quality and tone of your e-mails. This is true whether the e-mail contains a summary of a complex legal analysis or a three-line answer to a straightforward question. The quality and tone of our e-mails also tell our readers how we think of them; we can’t risk sending the message that we don’t respect them by writing e-mails that are too casual or too sloppy.

Here are several suggestions for writing e-mails that will reflect well upon you and your employer while meeting the needs and expectations of your readers.

·         Make the subject line appropriate and specific. “Smith discussion” is too casual and isn’t helpful; “Discussion of Bill Smith’s potential defamation claim” has a more appropriate level of formality and is more informative to the reader.

·         Carefully consider the salutation. Use a salutation at the beginning of each e-mail exchange. If a particular exchange continues over a period of time, you can usually drop the salutation. Whether you use the recipient’s last name (“Dear Ms. Miller”) or first name (“Dear Mary”) depends on the closeness of your professional relationship with the recipient.

·         Keep e-mails short. Common wisdom is that an e-mail longer than one screen contains more information than the reader is likely to absorb. So an e-mail might work fine for an analysis that can be communicated in two or three short paragraphs; anything longer should probably be included in an attachment to the e-mail.

·         State your bottom line at the outset of the e-mail. Even if you decide to put the formal analysis in a separate document attached to the e-mail, you should summarize its contents immediately and efficiently in the e-mail itself.

·         Don’t send an e-mail when you’re upset or emotional. A good rule of thumb is to ask yourself whether you would say what you wrote in the e-mail to the recipient’s face. An e-mail should not be a forum for venting, especially because it can be forwarded to an unlimited number of persons whom you never intended to read it.

·         Always review an e-mail to make sure it will be received by the reader in the way you intend. The reader can’t rely on your facial expressions, body language, or intonation to interpret the content of the e-mail. For example, an e-mail that is very short and abrupt (“Don’t know.”) may seem efficient to the writer, but the reader may find it rude and dismissive.

·         DON’T TYPE IN ALL CAPS. Readers often view all caps as “electronic shouting.”

·         Don’t use cute initialiams, and don’t use emoticons. Initialisms (often referred to as acronyms) such as “FWIW” and “TTYL” may be fine for texting your teenage daughter or your “BFF,” and the little smiley-face is cute, but you wouldn’t use them in a client letter, office memo, or settlement proposal, so don’t use them in your e-mails.

·         Draft every e-mail with an eye toward confidentiality (your own and your clients’).Generally, employers can monitor their employees’ e-mail if they’ve notified the employees that monitoring may occur. And e-mails containing content that’s not protected by attorney-client privilege are now discoverable in litigation. So be zealous about guarding your own privacy and your clients’ confidentiality at all times.

Laura Graham is an associate professor of Legal Writing at Wake Forest University School of Law. She can be contacted at grahamlp@wfu.edu.

Semicolon and Colon

The Semicolon

• Has the stopping strength of a period but indicates relation between two clauses like a comma does.  It's stronger than a comma but weaker than a period.

• Tells the reader that something still needs to be added to the previous independent clause.

• Serves three purposes
• To separate independent clauses of equal emphasis.
• To separate items in a list when each item contains a comma.
• To separate items in a list for clarity when the items are long.

• Use semicolons if you have similar ideas in several short sentences.  Make sure that your semicolon connects logically related ideas.
• The clause following a semicolon often restates or expands on an idea expressed in the first clause.  It can also present a contrast.

The Colon

• The colon is the equivalent of the phrase "THAT IS."
• It introduces explanations or predicted elements.  The difference between a colon and a semicolon is that the colon points to what's next.
• Colons can also be used between two independent clauses when the second amplifies or restates the first.  Colons signify a stronger relationship between clauses than do semicolons.

LTE's Handovers (by Qualcomm)

https://www.qualcomm.com/media/documents/files/lte-mobility-enhancements.pdf

1. Backward Handover

Backward handover can be described as network-controlled/UE-assisted mobility. Handover related information is exchanged between the UE and the source eNB via the old radio path (thus, the usage of the term ‘backward’). Specifically, the radio conditions need to be good enough for the source eNB to be able to decode the Measurement Report from the UE and subsequently prepare the target cell for handover. The radio conditions also need to be good enough for the UE to be able to decode the Handover Command from the source eNB.


2. RLC Handover

RLF handover is UE-based mobility and provides a recovery mechanism when the backward handover signaling with the source cell partially fails due to poor radio conditions. Specifically, the radio conditions are good enough for the source eNB to be able to decode the Measurement Report from the UE and subsequently prepare the target cell for handover, but not good enough for the UE to be able to decode the Handover Command from the source eNB1.  

What is CBM patent?

Under the statute, “the term ‘covered business method patent’ means a patent that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for “performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.”

Tech note with simple analogies

http://www.telecomhall.com/what-is-rrc-and-rab.aspx

Simple, handwriting notes to explain difficult concepts.

LTE - RRC Establishment (pdf)

RRC Establishment in LTE

[CAFC] Patent damage cases

Lucent Techs v. Gateway (2009)
Uniloc v. Microsoft (2011)
LaserDynamics v. Quanta Computer (2012)
VirnetX v. Cisco Systems (2014)

[CAFC] Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2016)

The Federal Circuit decided en banc Friday to retain its long-standing rule that overseas sales of a product don't exhaust a patent owner's right to sue in the U.S., concluding that a 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision that foreign sales exhaust copyrights has no impact on patent law.

In a 10-2 decision that runs 129 pages, the full court held that its own 2001 decision that only sales in the U.S. trigger patent exhaustion remains good law despite the high court's recent copyright decision.

The high court case, known as Kirtsaeng, "did not address patent law or whether a foreign sale should be viewed as conferring authority to engage in otherwise-infringing domestic acts," Federal Circuit Judge Richard Taranto wrote for the majority.

Under the Patent Act, "a foreign sale is properly treated as neither conclusively nor even presumptively exhausting the U.S. patentee’s rights in the United States," he said.

[Supreme Court] Nautilus v. BioSig

http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/06/reasonable-certainty-regarding.html

Through a series of cases, the Federal Circuit has implemented was arguably a stiff test of indefiniteness – making it quite difficult to find a claim invalid as indefinite. As the Supreme Court writes:

According to the Federal Circuit, a patent claim passes the §112, ¶2 threshold so long as the claim is “amenable to construction,” and the claim, as construed, is not “insolubly ambiguous.”

In its opinion here, the Supreme Court found that the insolubly ambiguous fails to apply the statutory requirement noted above. In its place, the court has created a new test as follows:

A patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art [at the time the patent was filed] about the scope of the invention. . . . .

The standard we adopt accords with opinions of this Court stating that “the certainty which the law requires in patents is not greater than is reasonable, having regard to their subject-matter.” Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U. S. 261, 270 (1916). . . .

[Case law] Plaintiff’s Infringement Expert Disqualified Due to Prior Retention by Defendant

Case No. 2:13-CV-947-JRG-RSP

Memorandum Order

Rule)
As set out by the Fifth Circuit in Koch Refining Co. v. Boudreaux, 85 F.3d 1178, 1181
(5th Cir. 1996), in order to disqualify an expert witness, the moving party must show

- that it had an objectively reasonable basis for a confidential relationship with the expert, and

- that confidential information relevant to the instant case was disclosed to the expert during that prior
relationship.

Issue)
The real dispute centers around whether the prior work was relevant to the current case.

Fact)
On that point, the Court is heavily influenced by the fact that

- the parties agree that the same devices accused in this case were accused in the earlier matter.

- Furthermore, the time frames are nearly overlapping. Plaintiff has not been able to show that the issues do not also overlap.

- Furthermore, Defendant objected within days of learning of Bims’ involvement in this case and
was diligent in seeking disqualification.

- Finally, Plaintiff has not presented any statement from Bims explaining why his prior work is not relevant to the current case.

Conclusion)
Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED

[Link] English Language and Usage

http://english.stackexchange.com/

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (template)

Rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 102

Claims 1-7

Claims 1-7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by [PA]. This rejection is respectfully traversed for the following reasons.

With respect to the Examiner's rejection, Applicant respectfully traverses the rejection on the basis that [PA] does not include all limitations as claimed.

/* Authority starts*/

MPEP § 2131 states that “‘[a] claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently [See related post] described, in a single prior art reference.’ Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987)” (emphasis added). “‘The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the ... claim.’ Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989)” (emphasis added). Moreover, “[e]very element of the claimed invention must be literally present, arranged as in the claim.” Id. (emphasis added).

/* Authority ends*/

Therefore, to properly reject claims 1-7 under U.S.C. §102, the disclosure of [PA] must include each and every element and limitation as arranged therein.

Referring to the specification for the purposes of illustration only, embodiments of
the claimed invention relate to ". . . " See paragraphs [00**]-[00**] of the originally published specification.

Accordingly, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "

Meanwhile, [PA] discloses, in part, ". . . " See paragraph [0083] of [PA].

Applicant respectfully asserts that [PA] fails to disclose all of the limitations of
independent claim 1. Specifically, independent claim 1 requires, in part, ". . . "  [PA], however, is directed toward . . .   [PA] is silent with regard to . . . , as claimed, and is instead concerned with . . . ..

In view of the above, as [PA] fails to anticipate at least the aforementioned
limitation as required by independent claim 1, a rejection under § 102 cannot be supported. Thus,
independent claim 1 is patentable over [PA]. Independent claim 7 contains substantially similar
limitations and therefore is also patentable over [PA] for at least the same reasons. Dependent
claims are allowable for at least the same reasons. Accordingly, withdrawal of this rejection is
respectfully requested.

Conclusion
Applicant believes this reply is fully responsive to all outstanding issues and places this application  in condition for allowance.   If this  belief is incorrect, or other issues arise, the Examiner is encouraged to contact the undersigned or his associates at the telephone number listed
below.

Sites for English Learning

http://www.phrasemix.com/   (Very easy)

[Patently-O] Most Cited Supreme Court Patent Decisions (2005-2015)

http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/supreme-court-cases.html

1. KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness)
2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctive relief)
3. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (challenging licensed patents)
4. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.Ct. 2060 (2011) (inducing infringement)
5. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (subject matter eligibility)
6. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S.Ct. 2238 (2011) (presumption of validity)
7. Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (tying)
8. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (exhaustion)
9. Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (infringement by export of components)
10. Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (post-verdict civil procedure requirements)
11. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289 (2012) (patent eligibility)
12. Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009) (appellate jurisdiction)
13. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (research exception to infringement)
14. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223 (2013) (competition law – drug settlements)
15. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059 (2013) (federal jurisdiction over cases involving patent law)
16. Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014) (unfair competition based upon false infringement allegations)
17. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120 (2014) (indefiniteness)
18. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 721 (2013) (standing after covenant not-to-sue)
19. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (ownership under Bayh-Dole)
20. Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (subject matter eligibility)
21. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014) (subject matter eligibility)
22. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2111 (2014) (divided infringement)
23. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S.Ct. 1670 (2012) (forcing correction of Orange Book listings)

KSR has actually rocketed to the position of most-cited Supreme Court patent case of all time followed by Markman (1996); U.S. Gypsom (1948) (antitrust-patent); Graham v. Deere (1966); and Warner-Jenkinson (1997).

Litigation Databank

http://litigation.maxval-ip.com/

Litigation databank

[LTE] PDCCH, CCE

http://nitintayal-lte-tutorials.blogspot.com/2013/05/all-about-pdcch-and-cce-allocation.html

[CAFC] Preamble - limiting? PACING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC v. GARMIN INTERNATIONAL, INC.

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1396.Opinion.2-13-2015.1.PDF

"Just because an embodiment does not expressly disclose a feature does not mean that embodiment excludes that feature."

"However, in a case such as this, where the patent describes multiple embodiments, every claim does not need to cover every embodiment."

LTE standards

http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/98-lte

http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/long-term-evolution

http://www.whatsag.com/G/Understanding_LTE.php

file:///C:/Users/mp071953/Downloads/the-lte-standard.pdf

http://www.comsocscv.org/docs/Talk_111109_MobileBroadband.pdf

http://www.extremetech.com/mobile/110711-what-is-lte

http://www.unwiredinsight.com/2012/3gpp-lte-releases

http://lte-tdd.org/

http://www.radio-electronics.com/info/cellulartelecomms/lte-long-term-evolution/lte-fdd-tdd-duplex.php

SS10. Basic exercise

- If notice is delivered in person or by certified mail with return receipt request, notice will be effective.
--> Notice will be effective only if it is delivered in person or by certified mail, return receipt requested.

- The court should presume that the administrator's functions have ceased only when evidence proves it.
--> Without contrary proof, the court should presume that the administrator's functions continue.

- If the administrator reviews the application and finds that it contain all the requisite materials, termination will be approved.
--> Termination will be approved only after the administrator reviews the application and finds it complete.

SS 9. Basic exercise

1. The court relied heavily on the district court's statement that (1) the would-be intervenors retained the right to appear through counsel, to participate in the fairness hearing, to conduct discovery, and (2) they had standing to appeal the court's approval or disapproval of the class-action settlement.

2. the identify of the parties

3. (1) is ongoing, (2) implicates ... , (3) affords

717 Madison Place Oral Arguments and the Federal Circuit

http://www.717madisonplace.com/

Free and low cost Patent Analysis Tool

http://ipassetmaximizerblog.com/free-and-low-cost-patent-search-and-analysis-tools-who-needs-expensive-name-brand-products/

http://thepatentanalyst.com/page/3/

http://www.intellogist.com/wiki/Main_Page

Citestack for Chrome

http://www.citestack.com/index.html

How to: 20 features you’ve never used in Word

http://www.pcauthority.com.au/Feature/374631,how-to-20-features-you8217ve-never-used-in-word.aspx

True.

ss 8, writing exercise

- The plaintiff testified and so did three witnesses on behalf of the corporation.
Answer) After the plaintiff testified, three witnesses testified for the corporation.

-  The court should decide this purely legal question.
Answer) The court decides this purely legal question.

- The court should deny M's motion ...
Answer) The court should deny McCormick’s motion for partial summary judgment on the duty to defend.

- The court may disregard plaintiff's opposition because it violates ...
Answer)  The court should disregard Thompson’s opposition because it violates California Rule of Court 313.

IN RE CUOZZO SPEED TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/opinions-orders/14-1301.Opinion.2-2-2015.1.PDF

Contrary to Cuozzo’s contention, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the PTO’s decision to institute IPR. We affirm the Board’s final determination, finding no error in the Board’s claim construction under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, the Board’s obviousness determination, and the Board’s denial of Cuozzo’s motion to amend.

ss7 writing exercise

1. 1.      Ms. L… accrued considerable debt to her family and others, during her struggle to provide for her children as a single parent.

---> While struggling as a single parent to provide for her children, Ms. L… accrued considerable debt to her family and others.

1. 2.      Chesapeake incorrectly asserts that it is not a proper defendant in this case, and, therefore, that relief cannot be granted.

---> Chesapeake incorrectly asserts that it is not a proper defendant in this case, and that therefore relief cannot be granted.

1. 3.      The court ruled that Office McGee’s primary role is not law enforcement because he was acting more as a school employee than as a police officer.
2. --> Finding that Officer McGee was acting more as a school employee than as a police officer in searching Robinson, the court ruled that an official's primary role is not law enforcement.

P.21 ss6 writing exercise

1.  Appellee Allied Indemnity of New York respectfully suggests that oral argument should not be allowed because the Texas Supreme Court (in National Union case) and this Court (in Constitution State case) decided dispositive issue.

Also, the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments.

Oral argument would not significantly aid the decisional process.

--> Oral argument would be of little benefit for two reasons.  First, the dispositive issue has recently been decided by the Texas Supreme Court ( ) and by this Court ( ). Second, the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and the record.

2.  No Kansas cases explicitly held that a corporation is required to have a valid business purpose to engage in certain transactions like mergers, consolidations, or a sale of assets followed by a dissolution and liquidation.  But, in a 1994 case involving a cash-out merger where the dissenters claimed the defendant's board of directors breached its fiduciary duties to the dissenters, the Supreme Court of Kansas cited as one of the trial court's holdings that a corporation does not need to show a valid corporate purpose of eliminating stockholders.  (88 words)

Answer) No Kansas cases explicitly hold that Kansas requires a corporation to have a valid business purpose to engage in certain specified transactions.  But in 1994 the Supreme Court of Kansas decided a case that bears on the question.  The case involved a cash-out merger in which the dissenters claimed that the defendant's board of directors breached its fiduciary duties to them.  The court found that a corporation need not show a valid corporate purpose of eliminating stockholders.

3.  The court of appeals noted that the EPA had issued a permit for the applicant to discharge wastewater that would occur from the outfall pipe.  Holders of the permit are generally exempted from complying with the EIS requirement.  Accordingly, the Corps, a holder of the permit, did not need to analyze the environmental implications of the discharges from the outfall pipe and instead considered only the construction and maintenance of the pipeline itself.  The court held that the issuance of the permit is not a major federal action.   

--> The court of appeals cited two salient points.

P.18 writing exercise. ss5

1. Even if the fog caused injury to Roelke, Amskills had no duty to prevent the injury that Amskills could not have been expected to foresee.

--> Even assuming that the fog caused Roelke's accident, Amskills had no duty to prevent such a freakish and unforeseeable injury.

2.  Before the initial offering, the underwriters, any officers, directors, or employees did not know any facts suggesting that "Palm Harbor" could not be completed on schedule and in accordance with specifications.

--> Before the initial offering, no one knew or had reason to know that Palm Harbor could not be timely completed in accordance with specifications.

3.  Beale failed to allege facts to establish that competition among the nation's law schools would be reduced or that the public has been in any way injured. Thus, her restraint-of-trade claim would be dismissed.

--> Beale has not alleged facts that, if true, would establish either public injury or reduced competition among the nation's law schools.  Thus, her restraint-of-trade claim must be dismissed.

4.  The Business Corporation law address that a New York corporation indemnifies only its employees.

--> The Business Corporation law does not address whether a New York corporation can indemnify nonemployees.

5.  The court stated that a duty to disclose the illegal conduct of persons who seek election to a public office through political campaigns exists in only a few instances of the cases it examined.

--> The court examined many cases and found few that imposed a duty to disclose the illegal conduct of candidates for elected office.

Headings for email memo

Issue and Answer,  
Summary of Law,
Impact on Client

source: http://sites.utexas.edu/legalwriting/

Writing exercise ss 3.

1)      In March 2000, Gilbert Spaulding applied to the Workforce Commission for extended unemployment benefits.  Because those benefits were not available during the period for which he sought eligibility, the Workforce Commission denied Spaulding’s request and the lower court correctly affirmed the denial.

(    

      M. Answer) In March 2000, Gilbert Spaulding applied to the Workforce Commission for extended unemployment benefits.  The commission denied the request because those benefits were not available during the period for which he sought eligibility. The trial court affirmed.

2)      The plaintiff, Pilsen Corporation, had only requested a partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of fraud.  The intermediate appellate court affirmed the lower court’s grant of the summary judgment.  However, the state supreme court reversed the affirmation.

     M. Answer)  Plaintiff, Pilsen Corporation, moved for a partial summary judgment on the discrete issue of fraud.  The trial court affirmed the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.  On further appeal, however, the state supreme court reversed.

3)      For three years Davis Energy has had a guard . . .  own property.  Under these circumstances, the issue is whether …

     M. Answer)  Davis Energy owns a fuel-storage yard that can be reached only by a private road.  For seven years, owners of adjacent lots have used the road to reach their property.  For the past three years, Davis has had a guard at the road's entrance but has posted no other notice about private property or permission to enter.  Has Davis, through its actions or silence, granted its neighbors an easement to use the road?

4)      Before 1958, the plaintiff Los Angeles Dodgers, the owner of a professional baseball team, played baseball in Brooklyn, New York, under the name “the Brooklyn Dodgers.”  In 1958, the plaintiff had offices in Los Angles, California, where it has played baseball since then.

      M. Answer)  Plaintiff Los Angeles Dodgers, a corporation owning a professional baseball team, began in New York as the Brooklyn Dodgers.  In 1958, the team moved the site of its home games from New York to California and changed its names to the Los Angeles Dodgers.  The organization's principal corporate offices are now in Los Angeles.

Learner's dictionary

http://www.learnersdictionary.com/

Legible

http://sites.utexas.edu/legalwriting/

Optimizing Microsoft Word for LRW

http://www.persuasiveauthority.com/2013/03/19/optimizing-microsoft-word-for-lrw/

To the extent it is determined to be necessary to include A in B,

Patent No. 6,071,103
Petition For Inter Partes Review

Although not believed to be real-parties-in-interest in the present Petition, out of an abundance of caution, Petitioner notes that it expects that a substantially similar petition is being filed by Nissan North America, Inc. To the extent it is determined to be necessary to include parties interested in that petition in the present Petition, the additional real-parties-in-interest are listed in the contemporaneously filed petition by Nissan North America, Inc. et al.

Northern California IP blog

http://blogs.orrick.com/norcal-ip/

by Orrick.

Legal citation plugin software

https://www.zotero.org/download/

http://lawlibraryguides.bu.edu/c.php?g=14784&p=79878#5776769

http://ica.library.oregonstate.edu/tutorials/631--Advanced-Zotero

Patent word geek

http://patentwordgeek.com/

102 - Anticipation

2131 Anticipation — Application of 35 U.S.C.
102 [R-11.2013]

A claimed invention may be rejected under 35
U.S.C. 102 when the invention is anticipated (or is
“not novel”) over a disclosure that is available as
prior art. To anticipate a claim, the disclosure must
teach every element of the claim.
“A claim is anticipated only if each and every
element as set forth in the claim is found, either
expressly or inherently described, in a single prior
art reference.” Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of
California, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051,
1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “When a claim covers several
structures or compositions, either generically or as
alternatives, the claim is deemed anticipated if any
of the structures or compositions within the scope
of the claim is known in the prior art.” Brown v.
3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351, 60 USPQ2d 1375, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (claim to a system for setting a
computer clock to an offset time to address the Year
2000 (Y2K) problem, applicable to records with year
date data in “at least one of two-digit, three-digit, or
four-digit” representations, was held anticipated by
a system that offsets year dates in only two-digit
formats). See also MPEP § 2131.02. “The identical
invention must be shown in as complete detail as is
contained in the ... claim.” Richardson v. Suzuki
Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913,
1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The elements must be
arranged as required by the claim, but this is not an
ipsissimis verbis test, i.e., identity of terminology
is not required. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 15
USPQ2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Note that, in some
circumstances, it is permissible to use multiple references in a 35 U.S.C. 102 rejection. See MPEP
§ 2131.01.

2131.05   Nonanalogous or Disparaging Prior Art [R-08.2012]

“Arguments that the alleged anticipatory prior art is ‘nonanalogous art’ or ‘teaches away from the invention’ or is not recognized as solving the problem solved by the claimed invention, [are] not ‘germane’ to a rejection under section 102.” Twin Disc, Inc.v. United States, 231 USPQ 417, 424 (Cl. Ct. 1986) (quoting In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1, 7 (CCPA 1982)). See also State Contracting & Eng’ g Corp. v. Condotte America, Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1068, 68 USPQ2d 1481, 1488 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (The question of whether a reference is analogous art is not relevant to whether that reference anticipates. A reference may be directed to an entirely different problem than the one addressed by the inventor, or may be from an entirely different field of endeavor than that of the claimed invention, yet the reference is still anticipatory if it explicitly or inherently discloses every limitation recited in the claims.).

A reference is no less anticipatory if, after disclosing the invention, the reference then disparages it. The question whether a reference “teaches away” from the invention is inapplicable to an anticipation analysis. Celeritas Technologies Ltd. v. Rockwell International Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 USPQ2d 1516, 1522-23 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The prior art was held to anticipate the claims even though it taught away from the claimed invention. “The fact that a modem with a single carrier data signal is shown to be less than optimal does not vitiate the fact that it is disclosed.”). See Upsher-Smith Labs. v. Pamlab, LLC, 412 F.3d 1319, 1323, 75 USPQ2d 1213, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 2005)(claimed composition that expressly excluded an ingredient held anticipated by reference composition that optionally included that same ingredient); see also Atlas Powder Co. v. IRECO, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1349, 51 USPQ2d 1943, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Claimed composition was anticipated by prior art reference that inherently met claim limitation of “sufficient aeration” even though reference taught away from air entrapment or purposeful aeration.).

PTAB / BPAI data site

http://www.patentboardferret.com/

http://www.ptab.us

Double Patenting

• Types of Double Patenting Rejections

nStatutory (35 U.S.C. 101) Double Patenting:

n Is There an Embodiment that Falls Within the Scope of One Claim, but Not the Other?

n   Could One Claim be Literally Infringed Without Literally Infringing the Other Claim?

--> If Examined claim and claim of potentially conflicting patent or application DO NOT exactly match in scope – DO NOT make a statutory (35 U.S.C. 101) double patenting rejection.

 

nNon-Statutory Double Patenting

nRejection based on obviousness analysis

nAnalogous to 35 U.S.C. 103 Analysis

nDetermine the Scope and Content of the Claims in the Conflicting Patent or Application

nAscertain the Differences Between the Claims in the Conflicting Patent or Application and the Claim in Issue

nResolve the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

nEvaluate Evidence of Secondary Considerations

nRejection based on anticipation analysis

nNon-Statutory Double Patenting Based Solely on Improper Timewise Extension of Patent Rights

* 35 U.S.C. 121 does not prohibit the rejection because xxx patent is a CIP of xxx patent.  If it is a divisional, a non-statutory DP rejection would not be proper.

Obviousness Analysis – Written Rejection

nAny Non-Statutory Double Patenting Rejection Based on an Obviousness Analysis Should Make Clear:

nThe differences between a claim in the examined application compared to a claim in the reference patent (or copending application)

nThe reasons for concluding that the invention defined in the claim at issue would have been an obvious variation of the invention defined in a claim in the patent (or copending application)

How to Overcome a Proper Double Patenting Rejection

n Statutory (35 U.S.C. 101) Double Patenting

nAmend the claim(s)

nCancel the claim(s)

nA terminal disclaimer is NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

nDeclarations under 37 CFR 1.131 are NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

n Non-Statutory Double Patenting (All Types)

nAmend the claim(s)

nCancel the claim(s)

nFile a proper terminal disclaimer

nDeclarations under 37 CFR 1.131 are NOT sufficient to overcome such a rejection

"Based on" vs. "On the basis of"

The phrases based on and on the basis of are often used interchangeably but should not be, because based on is a participle (a verbal adjective), which can define a noun, pronoun and noun phrase (but not a verb) whereas on the basis of is a prepositional phrase, which can define a verb. Examples of the different information transmitted by their correct usage are [The administration sent a document based on your suggestion] and [The administration sent a document on the basis of your suggestion]. In the former, based on rightly describes the nearest noun (a document) and so tells us that you had something to do with the content of the document; in the latter, on the basis of describes the verb (to send) and tells us that the idea of sending the document (rather than perhaps taking it in person) was yours.


http://www.asiaandro.com/ec/EC4.pdf

MS Word shortcut - indent and others

• Ctrl+M / Ctrl+Shift+M :  increase / decrease indent

• Tab: Go to the ‘File’ tab, and click on ‘Options’. From the list on the left, choose ‘Proofing’. Now, under ‘AutoCorrect options’, click on the ‘AutoCorrect Options…’ button. In the window which appears, click on the ‘AutoFormat As You Type’ tab. Select the ‘Set left- and first-indent with tabs and backspaces’ checkbox. Press the ‘OK’ button twice, and you’re done!

•  For anyone who cares, to change list level up, ALT+SHIFT+Right Arrow. To change it down a level, ALT+SHIFT+Left Arrow.

Patent Damages

http://patent-damages.com

Essential Patent Blog

http://www.essentialpatentblog.com/

Admissibility of Settlement-Related Evidence at Trial

FRE 408

Market Share approach

State Industries v. Mor-Flo Indus.  Fed Cir 1989.

The prevailing method for calculating lost profits damages in patent infringement originated with State Industries v. Mor-Flo1 in the late 1980s.

That decision established both the “market share” rule for lost sales and use of the split award.2

 The market share rule considers that portion of the patent holder’s relevant market that has been captured by the infringing firm.3 In the simplest two-firm model the market share rule assumes that the patent holder would capture all the infringing revenue.4

 

When the market also includes non-infringing alternatives, the market share rule divides the infringing sales among the patent holder and the non-infringing firms in proportion to their respective market shares.5

The split award includes a reasonable royalty to the patent holder for the infringing sales allocated to the non-infringing firms (the split award is not used with a two-firm market).6  The logic of State Industries therefore treats each infringing sale in the relevant market as either a lost sale for the patent holder or a basis for a royalty payment.7

Case laws related patent damages calculation

1.  Presidio Components v. Am. Tech.  (Fed Cir)

2. Rite-Hite v. Kelley

3. Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc.

Two limitations on patent damages- Six Year and Notice

Subject: Two limitations on patent damages- Six Year and Notice

* The Six Year limitation

35 U.S.C. §286 provides that "no recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counterclaim for infringement in the action."

* The Notice limitation

35 U.S.C. §287(a) provides for notice to the public by marking the patented article. If the patentee fails to mark its patents, it cannot recover damages in any infringement action, unless “the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter[.]”  Filing an infringement action is such notice.

1) Process or Method claims

The marking provision of § 287(a) does not apply to patents claiming only processes or methods. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  In cases where the patent claims are directed to only a method or process, there is nothing to mark. Id; see also Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

2) Apparatus and Method claims

When the patentee asserts both apparatus and method claims and to the extent that there is a tangible item to mark (i.e., a physical device produced by the claimed method), the notice provision applies.  Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

ResQnet

http://www.tiplj.org/wp-content/uploads/Volumes/v20/v20p181.pdf

a) ResQNet
In ResQnet, ResQNet’s (the patentee) expert relied on seven prior licenses as a “starting point” in determining the reasonable
royalty.51 Five of the licenses were “re-bundling” licenses, permitting the licensees to re-brand the patentee’s software, *192
re-bundle it with the licensee’s own products, and resell the newly-bundled products.52 In addition, the licenses included
services such as technical support and training, and did not specifically mention the patent at issue in the lawsuit.53 ResQNet
failed to offer evidence that the software in these re-bundling licenses (or the users of the software) practiced the patented
method.54 These licenses had a large sliding-royalty rate (a rate that changed depending on various circumstances).55

The Federal Circuit contrasted the large royalty rates in the re-bundling licenses, which showed “no discernible link to the
claimed technology,” with the lower royalty rates in the remaining two licenses, which arose out of litigation.56 Without
evidence of the link, if any, between the re-bundling licenses and the patented method, those re-bundling licenses were
essentially useless as evidence of a reasonable royalty.57 The patent-in-suit dealt “with a method of communicating between
host computers and remote terminals--not training, marketing, and customer support services. The re-bundling licenses
simply ha[d] no place in this case.”58

According to the majority, ResQNet’s expert relied almost exclusively on the first Georgia-Pacific factor--prior licenses of
the patent-in-suit--in evaluating the reasonable royalty.59 Consequently, after the Federal Circuit held that the trial court
should have disregarded the re-bundling licenses, only the two litigation licenses remained as potential damages evidence.60
The court observed in dicta “that the most reliable license in this record arose out of litigation,” but also noted that “litigation
itself can skew the results of the hypothetical negotiation.”61 On remand, *193 the district court would have to reconsider the
reasonable royalty calculation, and it “should not rely on unrelated licenses to increase the reasonable royalty rate above rates
more clearly linked to the economic demand for the claimed technology.”62 In concluding, the Federal Circuit faulted the
district court for relying on the re-bundling licenses “without any factual findings that accounted for the technological and
economic differences between those licenses and the [patent-in-suit].”63 A district court “must consider licenses that are
commensurate with what the defendant has appropriated.”64

In dissent, Judge Newman accused the majority of “creat[ing] a new rule whereby no licenses involving the patented
technology can be considered . . . if the patents themselves are not directly licensed or if the licenses include subject matter in
addition to that which was infringed by the defendant here.”65 The district court recognized that none of the licenses in
evidence was “a perfect approximation of the hypothetical license between ResQNet and Lansa.”66 Judge Newman noted that
“it is not necessary that the identical situation existed in past transactions, for the trier of fact to determine the value of the
injury,”67 and he accused the majority of depriving the fact-finder of relevant information.68

The majority in ResQNet did not hold that a district court may never consider “any licenses involving the technology of [the
patents-in-suit] bundled with additional technologies, such as software code.”69 Rather, the majority took issue with the
district court’s “considering ResQNet’s re-bundling licenses to significantly adjust upward the reasonable royalty without any
factual findings that accounted for the technological and economic differences between those licenses and the [infringed
patent].”70 The majority in ResQNet noted that reasonable royalty damages must be “carefully tie[d] . . . to the claimed
invention’s footprint in the marketplace,”71 and “[a]ny evidence unrelated to the claimed invention does not support *194
compensation for infringement.”72 Where licenses are “radically different from the hypothetical agreement under
consideration,” they are generally not competent proof of damages.73

Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F. 2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10790214856684669985&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

Micro Motion, Inc. v. Kane Steel Co., Inc., 894 F. 2d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

Patent Damages

A

If successful in an infringement suit, a patent owner may recover actual damages or at least a reasonable royalty. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1982). Where the patentee produces or sells a product (or service) covered by the patent claims, the patentee may seek to recover damages based on a theory of lost profits because the amount is likely to be greater than reasonable royalties.

To recover damages on the theory of "lost profits", a patentee must show that, but for the infringement, it would have made the infringer's sales. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 864, 226 USPQ 402, 409-10 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied,475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). This requirement of causation implicates the patentee's manufacturing capacity and marketing capability, the desires of customers for the claimed invention, the relationship of the claimed invention to the product sold and other factors pertinent to the particular market or parties. Causation is most easily found where only two companies, the patentee and the infringer, are in the market. Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc.,761 F.2d 649, 653, 225 USPQ 985, 987 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88 L.Ed.2d 229 (1985).

Where there is evidence of a third party competitor, the lost profits theory would appear to be nonviable inasmuch as the third party could have made the sale rather than the patentee. Under such circumstances, there appears to be no possible causation. However, such is not the law.

Patentees have successfully urged modifications to the basic damage theory so as to cover situations other than the simple two-supplier market. There is precedent for finding causation despite an alternative source of supply if that source is an infringer or puts out a noninfringing product that is an unacceptable alternative, or has insignificant sales. See, e.g., Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp.,739 F.2d 604, 222 USPQ 654 (Fed.Cir.) (proof of no acceptable substitutes), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed.2d 405 (1984); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 222 USPQ 4 (Fed.Cir.1984) (no alternative competing source where only four or five machines sold); Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 220 USPQ 490 (Fed.Cir.1983) (no acceptable alternatives because, inter alia, scale of operations of others was insignificant). Other litigants have been held entitled to lost profits damages calculated on a portion of an infringer's sales based on the patentee's market share. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577-78, 12 USPQ2d 1026, 1029 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 744 (U.S.1990). These various theories are all invoked here to justify discovery from K-Flow of its products, comparative test results, sales figures, customers' names, and the like, to enable Micro Motion to determine which version or versions of the various lost profits damage theories to pursue.

While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unquestionably allow broad discovery, a right to discovery is not unlimited. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 S.Ct. 385, 391, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947). As a matter of procedure, to secure protection from discovery, a nonparty may invoke the inherent power of the court, see 5A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, § 45.05[3], at 37 (2d ed.1989), or Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(b), if appropriate, to quash a subpoena. Under Rule 45(d), a nonparty subpoenaed for testimony and production 1323*1323 of documents may move for a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c), including an order that discovery not be had. Confidential commercial information warrants special protection under Rule 26(c)(7). Smith & Wesson v. United States, 782 F.2d 1074, 1082 (1st Cir.1986). A nonparty also may merely object to production of documents and things. Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(d)(1). By merely objecting, such discovery is foreclosed except pursuant to an order of the court. Id. Also, Rule 26(d), which pertains to controlling the sequence and timing of discovery, may be invoked as a mechanism for accommodating the competing interests of those involved in the discovery process, for example, by delaying discovery on damages until liability is established. Cf. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 53 S.Ct. 736, 77 L.Ed. 1449 (1933).

While the burdens may vary somewhat depending on which rule or procedure is invoked, the substantive considerations for denying a party discovery are generally the same and may be gleaned from Rule 26(b), (c) and (g). Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d at 1210-11, 2 USPQ2d at 1036-37; American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 739-42, 3 USPQ2d 1817, 1820-23 (Fed.Cir.1987); Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d at 1023-26, 228 USPQ at 931-33. Discovery may not be had regarding a matter which is not "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Even if relevant, discovery is not permitted where no need is shown, or compliance would be unduly burdensome, or where harm to the person from whom discovery is sought outweighs the need of the person seeking discovery of the information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d at 739-42, 3 USPQ2d at 1820-23. Rule 26(g) specifically requires that the party or his attorney seeking discovery must certify that he has made a "reasonable inquiry" that the request is warranted. This "reasonable inquiry" is also imposed by Rule 11. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules — 1983 Amendment ("Discovery motions, however, fall within the ambit of Rule 11."); see also Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., 855 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir.1988) (noting that Rule 26(g) "imposes a more stringent certification requirement than Rule 11" because a discovery request usually pertains to more specific subject matter than that covered under Rule 11). Each of the requests here is improper under one or more of these protective grounds.

CAFC Advisory Council

Link:  http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/advisory-council.html

ATRIP

International Association for  the Advancement of  Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property

ATRIP

Patent Tools

Patent Tools

The American Society of Legal Writers

http://www.scribes.org/

Useful sites for writing

http://plainlanguagenetwork.org/Resources/index.html

http://www.techcommunicators.com/pdfs/style-diction.pdf

Claim Construction database

http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/polk/fedcir/claim_construction/

Claim Preclusion = Res Judicata

http://www.caught.net/prose/resjud.htm

It's always hard to distinguish two mouthful concepts; Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel.

Here is a short summary; Claim Preclusion = Res Judicata whereas Issue Preclusion = Collateral Estoppel.

Shortcut to memorize this is that there should be only one "C" in each equation.

[ABA] Legal Writing: Ten Tips from the Trenches

http://www.abanet.org/yld/tyl/july10/writing.html

How to write like Elena Kagan

As a non-native, English writing would be my life-time burden.

As a way of improving writing, I sometimes study other persons' writing styles. One of sources I heavily rely on is LegalWritingPro.

Here's the material I received from the website;

http://www.legalwritingpro.com/articles/elena-kagan.pdf

WP's coverage on Supreme Court

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/package/supremecourt/index.html

Transcript of Senate's hearing about Comcast/NBC merger

Question - Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota)

Answer - Brian Roberts (CEO of Comcast)

March, 11, 2010. Senate Commerce committee's hearing.

Senator: I know a lot of lawyers are looking at this deal. But I just thought I'd run through a few things that I heard and people raised with me about concerns. One is that NBC and its affiliates have succeeded in by getting its programmings to as many viewers as possible and providing its contents. ... for free over -the-air and over-the-internet. Will Comcast use NBC's 31% stakes in Hulu.com to restrict selection of NBC programming that is available in Hulu.com and NBC.com?

Brian Roberts: No. I've never even personally met with the Hulu team. We own about 31% in non-controlling stake. We have no intention of changing NBC's relationship with Hulu. And, Hulu itself, from what I read in the presses, is going through business model reviews and how-to funded and what the future will be. We are not at that table and I look forward to learning more about that business once we get together if we do get together.

Senator: Do you expect Comcast to block any NBC content from the Internet and what about charging subscribers' fees?

Brian Roberts: Comcast does not want to block NBC content or, frankly, block any content on the Internet. And ... my vision is that a content creator in different windows has different business models. Sometimes they wanna pay-per-view like in movie theatres and sometimes you do that in your home. Sometimes it's ad-supported only. Sometimes it's a part of subscription. And who knows what other business models will come out in the future. From Comcast's perspective, my vision is to ,technologically, create a platform to make sure that contents are not pirated or it's authentic(ated) and finding a way to let content companies create their own business models that work for their businesses into the future.

Case Log at the Supreme Court

http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/supremecourtopinions/2009-09-30-supreme-court-cases_N.htm